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Abstract
Here we introduce a new assessment of emotion regulation called the Mentalized Affectivity
Scale (MAS). A large online adult sample (N = 2,840) completed the 60-item MAS along
with a battery of psychological measures. Results revealed a robust three-component struc-
ture underlying mentalized affectivity, which we labeled: Identifying emotions (the ability to
identify emotions and to reflect on the factors that influence them); Processing emotions
(the ability to modulate and distinguish complex emotions); and Expressing emotions (the
tendency to express emotions outwardly or inwardly). Hierarchical modeling suggested that
Processing emotions delineates from Identifying them, and Expressing emotions delineates
from Processing them. We then showed how these components are associated with per-
sonality traits, well-being, trauma, and 18 different psychological disorders (including mood,
neurological, and personality disorders). Notably, those with anxiety, mood, and personality
disorders showed a profile of high Identifying and low Processing compared to controls. Fur-
ther, results showed how mentalized affectivity scores varied across psychological treat-
ment modalities and years spent in therapy. Taken together, the model of mentalized
affectivity advances prior theory and research on emotion regulation and the MAS is a useful
and reliable instrument that can be used in both clinical and non-clinical settings in psychol-
ogy, psychiatry, and neuroscience.
Introduction
In early life, emotions seem to have a life of their own, but as cognition develops, people devise
strategies for managing their emotions that they strive to use throughout adulthood [1]. Emo-
tion regulation is one of the fasting growing areas in psychology [2] and several theories have
been developed to help our understanding of the regulatory processes that are adopted when
dealing with emotions [3–6]. However, there are currently a limited number of emotion regu-
lation measures in use, and they often target only specific aspects of emotion regulation, such
as deficits or dysfunction. Further, current models of emotion regulation do not take into
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account mentalizing (‘theory of mind’) and the ability to draw from prior and present contexts
to understand and manage emotions—both of which we argue are central to understanding
and regulating emotions [7]. The present research introduces a new model and assessment of
emotion regulation based on the theory of mentalized affectivity (MA), which integrates prior
theory and research on emotion regulation and mentalization [8]. By using this new assess-
ment in a large sample, we show how three aspects of mentalized affectivity (Identifying, Pro-
cessing, and Expressing) are linked to personality, well-being, trauma, clinical diagnoses
(including neurobiological, mood, and personality disorders) and psychological treatment his-
tories. As will be shown, the virtue of this new perspective on emotion regulation is its breadth,
with its measure covering a wider terrain than other measures in this area.
Theoretical background
Emotion regulation is a wide-ranging term that describes explicit and implicit processes that
involve monitoring, evaluating, altering, and modulating emotions [9–12]. Mentalization is
the cognitive and affective ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of ourselves and oth-
ers [13–15]. Over the past decades, theory, research, and measures have been developed in
each of these areas, in both clinical and non-clinical settings. Except for a few exceptions, these
constructs have been investigated and discussed independently in the psychological literature
[16]. This is surprising considering both are fundamental to how people understand, experi-
ence, and respond to their emotions. Indeed, the process of emotion regulation involves being
aware, understanding, and identifying one’s thoughts and feelings (i.e. mentalization), prior
to, during, and after the refining and modulating of the emotion.
Jurist [7–8] proposed a novel perspective on emotion regulation called the theory of menta-
lized affectivity (MA), which takes mentalization into account in the regulatory process. The
theory argues that affectively regulating (managing, altering, or changing) an emotion relies
on the capacity for mentalization. It argues that emotions are not just adjusted in a regulatory
process, but that they are also revalued in meaning. This more sophisticated aspect of emotion
regulation requires the ability to reflect on one’s thoughts and feelings and to mentalize about
the factors that may influence the emotion, such as childhood experiences or the present situa-
tion or context a person is in. This in turn helps to inform a person’s understanding about
their emotions and how to anticipate future situations.
Within MA theory, Jurist [8] proposed three delineated aspects that are part of a concentric
process of emotion regulation. The first is Identifying emotions, which in its most basic form
involves labeling emotions. It also includes deeper complexities that involve making sense of
emotions in the context of one’s personal history and exploring the meaning of emotions (e.g.
Why am I feeling this way?). The second aspect that follows Identifying emotions, is Processing
them. Processing involves modulation/regulating emotions. This includes changing the emo-
tion in some way, such as by duration or intensity. The third process that follows Processing is
Expressing emotions. Expressing involves the spectrum of communicating one’s thoughts and
emotions from inwardly to outwardly. A person’s prior history influences every aspect of emo-
tional experience from identifying and processing to expressing. Further, these elements are
tied to a person’s sense of agency with emotions—with identifying, there is the dawning of a
sense of agency, with modulating the actualization of agency, and with expressing, the results
or manifestations of agency.
A flow chart of MA theory is visually displayed in Fig 1. The chart begins with biological
bases (e.g. genetics and dispositional traits) at the top. Following biological bases is childhood
development. Specifically, within childhood development is attachment formation, the devel-
opment of ‘theory of mind’ and mentalization [17], and the development of cognitive and
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affective schemas [18]. After biological bases and childhood development are the three delin-
eated aspects of mentalized affectivity: Identifying, Processing, and Expressing. Expressing
emotions leads to interpersonal interactions with others and the environment—including
feedback from others and the experience of new situations and events (labeled in the diagram
as “environmental feedback”). This feedback and interplay with the environment is integrated
with prior schemas that impact mentalized affectivity. Further elaboration of MA theory can
be found in Jurist (2005; in press). In the present research, we aimed to develop an assessment
that would capture these three elements of emotion regulation.
Previous measures of emotion regulation and mentalization
There are several widely used scales used on emotion regulation, and they converge and
diverge with MA theory in various ways. The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale [4] is a
36-item self-report measure that captures six components of dysregulation in emotion regula-
tion: Non-acceptance of emotional responses (“Nonacceptence”); Difficulties engaging in goal
directed behavior (“Goals”); Impulse control difficulties (“Impulse”); Lack of emotional aware-
ness (“Aware); Limited access to emotion regulation strategies (“Strategies”); and Lack of
emotional clarity (“Clarity”). One limitation of the scale is that it doesn’t focus on the entire
spectrum and multi-dimensional space of emotion regulation—rather it focuses primarily on
deficits or difficulties. Further, it predominantly focuses on emotion regulation that occurs
during or after an individual feels a negative affect. Specifically, 27 of the 36 items begin with
the phrase “When I’m upset,. . .”. “Aware” and “Clarity” most closely resembles the negative
polar ends of Identifying from MA theory, and “Strategies” most closely resembles the negative
polar ends of Processing. “Nonacceptence”, “Goals”, and “Impulse” lie outside of the scope of
MA theory because they largely describe behavioral responses to emotions, rather than the
process of regulating, modulating, or refining them.
Another widely used measure of emotion regulation is the Emotion Regulation Question-
naire (ERQ) aimed to capture antecedent- and response-focused emotion regulation strategies,
which are based on the process model of emotion regulation [19]. A virtue of the ERQ is that
Fig 1. Flow chart of MA theory.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.g001
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in contrast to the DERS, it looks at both adaptive and maladaptive styles of emotion regulation.
The 10-item measure captures the factors: Reappraisal and Suppression (representing by ante-
cedent-focused and response-focused strategies respectively). The Reappraisal factor includes
items such as “I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in”
and “When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situa-
tion”. The Suppression factor includes items such as “I control my emotions by not expressing
them”, “When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them”, and “I keep
my emotions to myself”. The ERQ correlates with big five personality traits, and seeks to mea-
sure the regulation of emotions, emphasizing control and focusing, in particular, on change.
In relation to MA theory, the Reappraisal factor captures Processing and the Suppression fac-
tor captures the negative polar end of Expressing. However, there are no items from the ERQ
that represent elements of Identifying emotions.
Hofmann and Kashdan’s [20] Affective Style Questionnaire (ASQ) is a 20 item self-report
measure that builds on the notion that emotions can be regulated according to different styles.
The authors identify three styles, extending the ERQ’s distinction between cognitive reap-
praisal and expressive suppression, by distinguishing among concealing (suppression), adjust-
ing (cognitive reappraisal) and tolerating. The ASQ captures three factors: Concealing,
Adjusting, and Tolerating. Findings from the ASQ lend support to the findings from the ERQ
that concealing is a maladaptive strategy for coping with negative affect. The ASQ adds an
emphasis on how emotions are tolerated, particularly emotions of distress, and suggests that
personality has an impact on how someone regulates their emotions. In relation to MA theory,
the Adjusting factor captures Processing and the Concealing factor captures the negative polar
end of Expressing. As with the ERQ, there are no items from the ASQ that represent elements
of Identifying emotions.
A more recent measure is the Flexible Regulation of Emotional Expression Scale (FREE)
by Burton and Bonnano [21]. The measure questions emotion regulation scales that contrast
the desirability of cognitive reappraisal to the liability of expressive suppression, construing
the latter in terms of frequency of behavior, rather than ability. While conceding that the
FREE does not represent one dimension of expressive regulation, the authors draw attention
to a previously unidentified merit of the capacity to suppress expression. Notably, the
authors do not speculate where ability for expression comes from; nor do they focus atten-
tion on verbal expression per se. At the heart of the measure is an appreciation for both
expression and constraint, and for the notion that flexibility of expression is a buffer against
stress. The measure captures two second-order factors (Enhance and Suppress) and four
first-order factors (Enhance Positive, Enhance Negative, Suppress Positive, and Suppress
Negative). All scenarios of the questionnaire involve aspects of expressing or concealing an
emotion being felt, therefore, each of the FREE factors link to the Expressing dimension of
MA theory.
There are several measures on emotion regulation that are less widely used [3]. The Emo-
tional Regulation of Others and Self (EROS) [22] captures four factors related to improving
and worsening affects in both the self and others. The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Ques-
tionnaire (CERG) [23] measures how people think and feel in response to prior experiences. It
captures nine factors: Self-blame; Acceptance; Rumination; Positive refocusing; Refocus on
planning; Positive reappraisal; Putting into perspective; Catastrophizing; and Blaming others.
A limitation of this scale is that it only captures cognitive aspects of regulation. Further, the
measure only captures how someone responds to a negative life events and how they reflect on
those experiences—not necessarily emotions (“I think about the mistakes I have made in this
matter” and “I think that the situation also has its positive sides”) [24]. The Rumination factor
does, however, associate with aspects of Identifying in MA theory. There are also tangential
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scales to emotion regulation that are worth noting such as the Cope Inventory (COPE) [25]
and the Coping Styles Questionnaire (CSQ) [26] that do not capture emotion regulation, but
rather individual differences in how people cope (e.g. avoidance or problem-focused) with dif-
ferent situations rather than focusing on emotions.
Measures on mentalization are also relevant for emotion regulation. The newly developed
self-report Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ) [27] captures mentalization (previ-
ously measured with interview-based questionnaire [28], which consists of both interpersonal
and self-reflective components that help to interpret the thoughts and feelings of another and
oneself. The 70-item RFQ captures two factors: Certainty and Uncertainty. These factors most
closely resemble the Identifying aspects of MA theory, but do not capture aspects of Processing
or Expressing. In addition, the RFQ assumes, but does not actually measure how previous life
history and experience may inform how we identify and understand emotions. Finally, the
RFQ focuses on mentalization in general, rather than on emotions.
Other measures that are similar to mentalization and the Identifying aspect of MA theory
are scales on alexithymia and to a lesser extent, scales on rumination. For example, the
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS) [29] captures three factors related to Identifying emotions:
difficulty in describing feelings, difficulty in identifying feelings, and emotionally-oriented
thinking. In terms of ruminations, scales such as the Rumination Inventory (RI) [30] captures
several factors including Tendency Toward Repetitive Thought; Tendency to Engage in Men-
tal Rehearsal of Future and Past Events; and Distractibility. Though rumination measures
capture aspects of a process involved in labeling emotions and thinking about events that influ-
ence them, they do not explicitly capture aspects of Identifying, and lie tangential to menta-
lized affectivity and emotion regulation.
Another related construct is empathy, which involves both the cognitive and affective abil-
ity to understanding and respond to the emotions of others [31]. It involves an aspect of
cognitive empathy (also referred to as theory of mind or mentalization) where a person puts
themselves in another’s shoes to identify their thoughts and emotions. It also involves the
affective aspect of responding to others with an appropriate emotion by processing the situa-
tion another person is in and how it makes one feel (including feeling sympathy in response to
another person’s suffering). Empathy also involves elements of social interaction. The Empa-
thy Quotient [31] because it captures scores on these three elements. Specifically, it measures
facets of Cognitive Empathy, Emotional Reactivity (i.e. affective empathy), and Social Skills.
Empathy and its three facets resemble the three MA components of Identifying, Processing,
and Expressing, however, they are directed outward to people and objects rather than inward
to the self.
As can be seen, prior measures on emotion regulation, coping, mentalization, alexithymia,
and rumination capture aspects of MA theory, but none capture all three components, and
they do not address aspects of understanding prior and present contexts that inform emotion
regulation. We have displayed this comparison of measures visually in Fig 2. The diagram
highlights two important conclusions: 1) all three aspects of mentalized affectivity have been
captured in prior measures on emotion regulation, giving precedent for studying them in rela-
tion to emotion regulation and 2) none of the measures reviewed captures all three aspects of
mentalized affectivity within in a single instrument which gives us further rationale to develop
a single measure that captures all three.
Aims
The overarching goal of the present research was to establish a new multi-dimensional assess-
ment of emotion regulation based on MA theory and to build a model in which we can
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understand MA in relation to personality, well-being, psychopathology and psychological
treatment. Specifically, we aimed to:
1. develop a novel multi-dimensional self-report assessment of emotion regulation based on
MA theory (part 1)
2. examine the latent and hierarchical structure of assessment (part 1).
3. test the assessment’s reliability and validity (part 1);
4. examine the psychological correlates of mentalized affectivity including demographics, per-
sonality, trauma, and well-being (part 2);
5. test how mentalized affectivity is differentiated across 18 psychological disorders (e.g.
Autism, Borderline Personality Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disor-
der, Generalized Affectivity Disorder, Depression) (part 3);
6. examine how mentalized affectivity is linked to prior psychological treatments (e.g. CBT,
Mindfulness-Based Therapy, and Psychotherapy) (part 3).
We had several hypotheses prior to analysis. First, we predicted that the newly developed
scale would reduce into three distinct factors based on MA theory. Second, we predicted that
the MA components would correlate with personality and well-being in unique ways. We
hypothesized that Identifying would be positively correlated with Openness to Experience,
Processing would be negatively correlated with Neuroticism, and Expression would be posi-
tively correlated with Extraversion. We predicted that all three MA components would be pos-
itively correlated with life satisfaction. We also predicted that Processing would be lower for
most psychological disorders including mood and anxiety disorders, and that all three MA fac-
tors would be elevated for those with prior psychological treatment.
Fig 2. Diagram of converging and diverging scales from prior measures related to emotion
regulation.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.g002
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Methods
Participants and procedure
Data was collected online via a website hosted by Qualtrics where participants can take a vari-
ety of psychological tests on music, personality, and social psychology (e.g. the Big Five person-
ality traits) in exchange for feedback about their scores. Providing feedback to participants,
was our attempt to motivate participants to complete the questionnaire accurately and care-
fully. Because the data was collected was online, we ensured that all responses came from dif-
ferent IP addresses and only included those participants who completed all items of the
measures taken. A total of 2,840 participants completed a test battery that included the Menta-
lized Affectivity Scale (MAS) and measures on personality and well-being. Subsamples com-
pleted additional measures on trauma, empathy, clinical diagnoses, and prior history of
psychological treatment. Of those who indicated, 901 (42%) were male, 1180 (55%) were
female, 29 (1%) were transgender, and 24 (1%) indicated "other". Participants ranged in age
from 18 to 65 with a mean of 31.58 (SD = 11.90). Of those who indicated, 1,530 (72%) were
White Caucasian, 36 (2%) were African-American or Black, 82 (4%) were Chinese, 81 (4%)
were Latino, and 100 (5%) were mixed. The de-identified data is available in supporting infor-
mation [S1 Dataset].
Test development
Items for the MAS were generated by four experts, who had previously received weekly train-
ing for a year on the emotion regulation and mentalization. In step 1, items were generated
based on six different categories and subcategories aligned with the theory of mentalized affec-
tivity: identifying basic affects, identifying complex affects, processing: modulating, processing:
refining, outward expressing, and inward expressing. A seventh category of items was devel-
oped to include items related to the ability to reflect how present emotions relate to prior and
present contexts and experiences (e.g. during childhood). In step 2, two of the judges refined
the initial list of items to 76 by removing redundant and poorly worded items.
Convergent measures
The EQ is a 60-item self-report questionnaire that measures cognitive and affective compo-
nents of empathy. Of the 60 items, 20 are filler leaving a total of 40 items that measure empathy
directly. To prevent participant fatigue, the 20 filler items were excluded, and therefore partici-
pants were only presented with 40 items. Participants were asked to indicate their degree of
agreement for each statement on a four point scale (strongly disagree, slightly disagree, slightly
agree, or strongly agree). For positively poled items, two points are given for strong agreement
and one point is given for slight agreement. For negatively poled items, two points are given
for strong disagreement and one point is given for slight disagreement. Cronbach’s alpha was
equal to .90.
Measures of psychological correlates
Personality. Personality was assessed with the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI)
[32]. The TIPI is a very brief measure of the Big Five personality traits and has strong conver-
gent and discriminant validity with related instruments. Participants rated the extent to which
each item was characteristic of themselves using a seven-point scale with endpoints at 1
(extremely uncharacteristic) to 7 (extremely characteristic). Cronbach’s alphas were equal to .70,
.41, .62, .69, and .40 for Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientious, Neuroticism, and
The Mentalized Affectivity Scale
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Openness, respectively. These are consistent with the Cronbach’s alphas found in the study of
the development of the TIPI [32].
Well-being. General well-being was assessed with the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS)
[33]. The SWLS contains five items that measures a person’s judgment about their feelings of
life satisfaction. Participants respond to each of the statements using a 7-point scale with end-
points from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). Cronbach’s alpha was equal to .89.
Trauma. Recent trauma histories were assessed with a modified version of the Traumatic
Events Scale [34]. We did not include items about childhood trauma to avoid participant
fatigue and biases related to memory recall. Specifically, participants were asked four
questions;
1. “Within the last 3 years, did you experience any other major upheaval that you think may
have shaped your life or personality significantly?” Participants responded with one of
either three answer choices: “Yes”, “No”, and “Rather Not Say”. If participants indicated
“Yes”, then they were asked to provide details via open text.
2. “How traumatic was this?” Participants responded to this item with a seven point scale
ranging from 1 (not at all traumatic) to 7 (extremely traumatic).
3. “When exactly did the event occur?” Participants responded to this item with one of 36
answer choices ranging from 1 month to 36 months.
4. “How much did you confide in others about the experience at the time?” Participants
responded to this item with a seven point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great
deal).
Questionnaire on clinical diagnoses. Participants were presented with a list of 17 clinical
diagnoses with a box for text entry. They were asked to indicate if they had been diagnosed
with any of the clinical diagnoses and if so, to indicate the year they were diagnosed, and if
they currently experience symptoms by typing “yes” or “no” in the open text box provided.
Specifically, participants were asked: “Please indicate below if you have been diagnosed with
any of the following conditions. You can select multiple items. For each condition you have
been diagnosed with, in the space provided type the age when you were diagnosed and if you
currently have symptoms by typing ’yes’ or ’no’.”The list included the following: Alexithymia;
Anorexia Nervosa; Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD); Bipolar Disorder; Bor-
derline Personality Disorder; Bulimia Nervosa; Depression; Dyslexia; Epilepsy; General Anxi-
ety Disorder (GAD); Narcissistic Personality Disorder; Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
(OCD); Panic Disorder; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD); Schizophrenia; Seasonal Affec-
tive Disorder (SAD); and Social Anxiety Disorder; Synesthesia.
Participants were separately asked about autism with three questions. They were asked
“Have you been formally diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC) by a profes-
sional?” with “Yes”, “No”, and “Other (please specify)”. Second, they were asked “If you
answered yes to the question above, please indicate the Autism Spectrum Condition that you
have been diagnosed with” and presented with five answer choices: Autistic Disorder (classical
autism); Asperger Syndrome (AS); Pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise specified
(PDD-NOS); High-Functioning Autism (HFA); Other (please specify). Third, participants
were asked “If you answered yes to the question above, at what age were you diagnosed?” with
90 answer choices ranging from 1 year to 90+ years.
Questionnaire on psychological interventions. Participants were asked three questions
about their prior history with psychological treatment. First, participants were asked, “Are you
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currently in therapy?” and presented with three answer choices: “Yes”, “No”, and “Rather not
Say”. Second, participants were asked “How long have you been in therapy over the course of
your life?” with answer choices ranging from “0 years” to “more than 60 years” with half year
intervals (e.g. 0, .5, 1.0, 1.5, years). Third, participants were asked, “What kind of therapy were
you in? (you can select more than one answers choice)” with answers choices including: I do
not know; I have never been in therapy; Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT); Couples Ther-
apy; Creative Arts Therapy; Dialectical Behavior Therapy; Exposure Therapy; Family Therapy;
Group Therapy; Mindfulness-based Therapy; Psychoanalysis; and Psychotherapy.
Results
Part 1: The structure, reliability, and validity of the MAS
Pilot analysis. Principal-components analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation was per-
formed on 76 mentalized affectivity items. The examination of the scree plot suggested an
“elbow” at four components suggesting we retain three components. The fourth component
was comparatively small and only accounted for an additional 3.8% of the variance. The three
components together accounted for 40% of the variance. Item loadings are reported in S1
Table.
One of the limitations of the 76-item version of the MAS is its long length and the potential
for participant fatigue when used in the future by researchers. Therefore, in an attempt to elim-
inate items we conducted two separate steps to psychometrically remove items. First, we
removed items that did not have loadings of .40 or above on any of the components. We iden-
tified six items (72, 40, 58, 16, 14, and 7) that met this criterion and removed them from the
final analyses. Second, we identified items that described the mentalized affectivity of others,
such as, “Knowing about the childhood experiences of others helps me to understand their
emotions” and “I try to understand the complexity of other people’s emotions.” We deemed
these items problematic because of the possibility of subjects to be able to identify and menta-
lize about other people’s emotions but not their own (as may exist in the case of some person-
ality disorders). We identified ten items (62, 43, 51, 32, 10, 9, 29, 65, 37, and 11) that met this
criterion and removed them from the final analysis. However, we kept items that referred to
using other people’s emotions to help identify their own, because these still involved the pro-
cess of identifying emotions about oneself (e.g. item 64: “Thinking about other people’s emo-
tional experiences helps me to think about my own”). After eliminating items using these two
steps, 60-items remained for the final analyses.
PCA on 60-item MAS. A second principal-components analysis (PCA) with varimax
rotation was performed on the final 60 mentalized affectivity items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .95. The examination of the scree plot suggested an
“elbow” at four components suggesting we retain three components (S1 Fig). The fourth com-
ponent was comparatively small and only accounted for an additional 4% of the variance. The
three components together accounted for 43% of the variance. Additional analysis on sub-
groups separated by males and females indicated that the identical scree plots and components
structure emerged, suggesting that there were no sex differences driving the component
structure.
Table 1 displays the component loadings for the three mentalized affectivity components.
As can be seen, the components are transparent and robust with most of the items on each
component showing very small secondary loadings. Table 2 displays the between-component
correlations. As can be seen, all between-component correlations are below .24 suggesting that
each component is independent from one another.
The Mentalized Affectivity Scale
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Table 1. Component loadings for 60-item MAS.
Principal
Component
I II III
37. I often look back at my life history to help inform my current emotional state and
situation.
.78 .03 -.02
18. I often think about my past experiences to help me understand emotions that I feel in
the present.
.75 -.07 -.03
46. I try to put effort into identifying my emotions. .74 .05 -.02
42. I am curious about identifying my emotions. .73 .01 -.07
33. I try to understand the complexity of my emotions. .73 .09 -.05
70. It’s important to understand the major life events that have had an impact on my
behavior.
.73 .04 -.03
67. It is helpful to think about how my emotions stem from family dynamics. .70 .06 -.05
16. Knowing about my childhood experiences helps to put my present emotions within a
larger context.
.68 .06 -.01
1. I often think about how the emotions that I feel stem from earlier life experiences (e.g.
family dynamics during childhood).
.68 -.18 -.01
47. I can pinpoint childhood experiences that influence the way that I often think and feel. .67 .08 .00
34. It is important for me to acknowledge my own true feelings. .67 .14 -.20
66. I can see how prior relationships influence the relationships that I have now. .65 .14 -.06
8. I am interested in learning about why I feel certain emotions more frequently than
others.
.64 -.14 -.09
28. It helps me to know the reasons behind why I feel the way that I do. .61 .07 .00
12. Understanding my emotional experience is an ongoing process. .61 -.14 -.02
5. I can see how prior relationships influence my current emotions. .61 .07 -.04
64. Thinking about other people’s emotional experiences helps me to think about my own. .59 .10 -.16
35. I often figure out where my emotions stem from. .58 .41 -.12
29. I am aware of recurrent patterns to my emotions. .56 .21 -.04
69. I rarely think about the reasons behind why I am feeling a certain way. -.56 .00 .09
8. I put effort into managing my emotions. .52 .02 .12
4. I use tools I have learned to help when I am in difficult emotional situations. .48 .23 -.02
68. I am open to other people’s view of me because it helps me to better understand
myself.
.41 .14 -.06
38. I am open to what others say about me to help me know what I am feeling. .40 .12 -.03
15. It is hard for me to manage my emotions. .18 -.71 -.10
10. When I am filled with a negative emotion, I know how to handle it. .00 .68 .12
23. I am good at controlling my emotions. -.11 .67 .35
13. I am often confused about the emotions that I feel. .12 -.66 .18
41. I am good at distinguishing between different emotions that I feel. .30 .64 -.09
74. I can quickly identify my emotions without having to think too much about it. .12 .61 -.25
11. I often know the reasons why I feel the emotions I do. .22 .58 -.13
75. I am able to understand my emotions within the context of my surroundings. .31 .57 -.13
26. I am good at controlling emotions that I do not want to feel. -.12 .57 .22
14. I am able to adjust my emotions to be more precise. .13 .57 .08
76. I can tell if I am feeling a combination of emotions at the same time. .37 .56 -.14
6. I can still think rationally even if my emotions are complex. .05 .56 .25
25. When I am filled with a positive emotion, I know how to keep the feeling going. .07 .54 -.14
24. When I express my emotions to others, it is usually jumbled. .00 -.53 .38
7. I am able to wait to act on my emotions. .06 .52 .45
43. If a feeling makes me feel uncomfortable, I can easily get rid of it. -.18 .51 .16
(Continued )
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Hierarchical structure. The hierarchical structure of the one-component through three-
component solutions was conducted using the procedure proposed by Goldberg [35]. First, a
single component was specified in a PCA and then in two subsequent PCAs we specified two
and three orthogonally rotated components. The component scores were saved for each solu-
tion. Next, correlations between component scores at adjacent levels were computed. The
resulting hierarchical structure is displayed in Fig 1 (the hierarchical diagrams in this article
were created in part by the Factor Diagrammer [Version 1.1b]) [36].
Items that loaded highest on the one-component solution (FUPC) represented identifying
and have a curiosity about understanding emotions, including “I often figure out where my
emotions stem from”, “It is important for me to acknowledge my own true feelings”, and
Table 1. (Continued)
Principal
Component
I II III
39. People get confused when I try to express my emotions. .03 -.50 .35
32. It takes me a while to know how I am really feeling. .09 -.49 .35
22. I am good at increasing emotions that I want to feel more. .13 .48 -.15
17. It is easy for me to notice when I am feeling different emotions at the same time. .39 .47 -.08
21. I can easily label “basic emotions” (fear, anger, sadness joy and surprise) that I feel. .28 .46 -.09
3. I am good at understanding other people’s complex emotions. .34 .42 -.22
71. I am not aware of the emotions I’m feeling when in conversation. -.22 -.41 .24
20. I often keep my emotions inside. -.06 -.07 -.80
31. If I feel something, I prefer not to discuss it with others. -.13 -.14 -.75
36. If I feel something, I rather not convey it to others. -.04 -.11 -.75
44. I often know what I feel but choose not to reveal it outwardly. .07 .13 -.69
48. If I feel something, I will convey it to others. .21 .16 .68
9. It is hard for me to talk about my complex emotions. -.09 -.37 -.64
45. If I feel something, it often comes pouring out of me. .18 -.25 .58
30. People tell me I am good at expressing my emotions. .27 .39 .56
2. I can express my emotions clearly to others. .20 .50 .51
19. I am able to keep my emotions to myself if the timing to express them isn’t right. .04 .44 -.51
73. I am more comfortable ‘talking around’ emotions I am feeling, rather than talking about
them directly.
.00 -.16 -.50
40. Sometimes it is good to keep my emotions to myself. .10 -.01 -.48
27. I am quick to act on my emotions. .19 -.22 .42
N = 2,840. The largest loading for each item is highlighted in bold.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t001
Table 2. Between-component correlations for 60-item MAS.
Identifying Processing Expressing
Identifying 1 .24** .24**
Processing .24** 1 .22**
Expressing .24** .22** 1
N = 2,840;
*p < .05;
**p < .01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t002
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“I often look back at my life history to help inform my current emotional state and situation”.
Items in the two-component solution appeared to represent “Identifying” and “Processing”
dimensions of mentalized affectivity. Items that loaded highly on the “Identifying” dimensions
were “I often look back at my life history to help inform my current emotional state and situa-
tion”, “I am curious about identifying my emotions”, and “I try to understand the complexity
of my emotions”. This component remained virtually unchanged in the three-component
solution. Items that loaded high on the “Processing” dimension were “I am good at distin-
guishing between different emotions that I feel”, “It is hard for me to manage my emotions”,
“I can express my emotions clearly to others”, and “When I am filled with a negative emotion,
I know how to handle it”, and “I am often confused about the emotions that I feel”. In the
three-component solution, the “Processing” dimension split into two subcomponents that dif-
ferentiated “Processing” affects from “Expressing” affects. Items that loaded highly on the
“Expressing” dimension were, “I often keep my emotions inside”, “I often know what I feel but
choose not to reveal it outwardly”, “If I feel something, I will convey it to others”, and “If I feel
something, it often comes pouring out of me”. The hierarchical structure suggests that Process-
ing delineates from Identifying, and Expressing delineates from Processing, which provides
empirical support MA theory. The hierarchical structure is visually displayed in Fig 3.
Reliability. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated based on the scale scores from each of the
three components. Reliability for the 24-item Identifying component was .93. Assessing
Fig 3. Varimax principal components derived from ratings for 60-items of the MAS. The figure begins (top box) with the First Unrotated Principal
Component (FUPC) and displays the genesis of the derivation of the 3 components obtained. Text within each box indicates the label of the factor. Arabic
numerals within boxes indicate the number of factors extracted for a given level (numerator) and the factor number within that level (denominator; e.g., 2/1
indicates the first component in a two-component solution). Arabic numerals within the arrow paths indicate the Pearson product-moment correlation
between a component obtained early in the extraction and a later component. For example, when expanding from a two-component solution to a three-
factor solution (rows 2 and 3), we see that Factor 2/2, “Processing” splits into two new factors, “Processing” (which correlates .97 with the parent
component) and “Expressing” (which correlates .23 with the parent component).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.g003
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Cronbach’s alpha for each item if it were removed did not go below .92. Reliability for the
23-item Processing component was .90. Assessing Cronbach’s alpha for each item if it were
removed did not go below .90. Reliability for the 13-item Expressing component was .88.
Assessing Cronbach’s alpha for each item if it were removed did not go below .86.
Convergent validity. Convergent validity was assessed with correlations between the
three mentalized affectivity components and the EQ total and facet scores (cognitive empathy,
social skills, and emotional reactivity). As empathy is defined as the ability to understand the
thoughts and feelings of others and to predict others’ behavior based on that information
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2003), it would be expected that empathy would correlate with
mentalized affectivity, which is concerned with understanding, processing, and communicat-
ing one’s own thoughts and feelings. As can be seen in Table 3, EQ total scores were correlated
with Identifying, Processing, and Expressing. The same happened with Cognitive Empathy,
with the highest correlation with Processing. Emotional Reactivity was most highly correlated
with Identifying, and significantly correlated with Expressing. Social Skills was most highly
correlated with Processing, and significantly correlated with Expressing.
Part 2: The psychological correlates of the mentalized affectivity scale
Demographics. Independent samples t-tests showed that there was a significant differ-
ence between males and females for Identifying (t(2,084) = 8.04, p< .001), Processing
(t(2,084) = -2.84, p< .001) and Expressing (t(1,790) = 3.59, p< .001). For Identifying, females
(M = 5.33, SD = .82) scored higher than males (M = 5.02, SD = .93); for Processing, males
(M = 4.67, SD = .82) scored higher than females (M = 4.56, SD = .83), and for Expressing,
females (M = 4.58, SD = 1.03) scored higher than males ((M = 4.42, SD = .98). As seen in
Table 4, age was positively correlated with Processing and Expressing, education was positively
correlated with Processing, and income was negatively correlated with Identifying, but posi-
tively correlated with Processing and Expressing.
Personality and well-being. Correlations between mentalized affectivity, personality, and
well-being are displayed in Table 4. Openness and Agreeableness was most positively corre-
lated with Identifying and Processing, Conscientiousness was positively correlated with Pro-
cessing, Extraversion was most positively correlated with Expressing, and Neuroticism was
positively correlated with Identifying and Expressing, and negatively correlated with Process-
ing. In terms of well-being, satisfaction with life scores was positively correlated with both Pro-
cessing and Expressing.
Trauma. Independent samples t-tests showed that there was a significant difference
between those who reported they experienced a recent (trauma group) and those who did not
(no trauma group) for Identifying (t(1,790) = 10.08, p< .001) and Expressing (t(1,790) = 3.51,
Table 3. Convergent correlations with the Empathy Quotient.
Mentalized Affectivity Components
Identifying Processing Expressing
EQ Total .35** .37** .15*
Cognitive Empathy .32** .45** .13*
Emotional Reactivity .37** -.03 .18**
Social Skills .10 .45** .20**
N = 267;
*p < .05;
**p < .01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t003
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p< .001). For Identifying, the trauma group (M = 5.43, SD = .81) scored higher than the no
trauma group (M = 5.01, SD = .91), and for Expressing the trauma group (M = 4.62, SD = 1.01)
scored higher than the no trauma group (M = 4.45 SD = 1.01). There was no significant differ-
ence between the groups for Processing. Mean differences are displayed visually in Fig 4 (error
Table 4. External correlates of mentalized affectivity.
Mentalized Affectivity Components
Identifying Processing Expressing
Demographics
Age -.05* .15** .11**
Education .03 .08** -.02
Income -.08** .07** .06*
Big Five
Openness .23** .20** .09**
Conscientiousness -.01 .30** -.02
Extraversion .05* .18** .41**
Agreeableness .17** .22** .06**
Neuroticism .23** -.55** .14**
Well-Being
Life Satisfaction -.03 .36** .13**
N = 2,840;
*p < .05;
**p < .01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t004
Fig 4. Mean differences between MA factors for trauma groups.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.g004
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bars indicate standard error). Mentalized affectivity components were correlated with trauma
severity and the degree to which participants reported that they confided in others after the
trauma. As can be seen in Table 5, trauma severity was positively correlated with Identifying,
and confiding in others was most positively correlated with Expressing. There was no signifi-
cant correlation between the MA components and the amount of time that had passed since
the trauma.
Linear regressions predicting well-being. We next performed hierarchical multiple
regression models predicting life satisfaction. As seen in Table 6, in Model 1 we included only
demographic variables (sex, age, education, and income), which accounted for 4% of the vari-
ance, with education and income demonstrating the largest associations with life satisfaction.
In Model 2 we added the Big Five personality traits. This model accounted for 26% of the
Table 5. Mentalized affectivity correlates with recent trauma.
Mentalized Affectivity Components
Identifying Processing Expressing
Severity of Trauma .20** -.06 .05
When Trauma Occurred .00 .03 .00
Confided in Others .13** .20** .32**
Ns = 761 to 789;
*p < .05;
**p < .01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t005
Table 6. Multiple hierarchical linear regression models for predicting life satisfaction.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable B (SE) β B (SE) β B (SE) β B (SE) Β
(Constant) 3.54 .30 2.93 .47 3.34 .50 3.64 .78
Sex .15 .11 .05 .07 .10 .02 .08 .10 .03 .06 .10 .02
Age -.01 .00 -.05 -.02 .00 -.15** -.02 .00 -.17** -.02 .00 -.15**
Education .14 .05 .10* .10 .05 .07* .09 .05 .06 .08 .05 .05
Income .04 .01 .16** .03 .01 .10* .03 .01 .11* .03 .01 .11*
Openness .04 .05 .03 .01 .05 .01 .04 .05 .02
Conscientiousness .19 .04 .18** .15 .04 .15** .15 .04 .14**
Extraversion .18 .03 .20** .14 .03 .15** .12 .03 .14**
Agreeableness .18 .04 .16** .16 .04 .14** .16 .04 .14**
Neuroticism -.27 .04 -.27** -.22 .04 -.22** -.18 .04 -.18**
Identifying -.01 .06 -.01 .01 .06 .00
Processing .23 .06 .17** .22 .06 .16**
Expressing .11 -.05 .08* .08 -.05 .06
Recent Trauma (0 = no, 1 = yes) -.35 .61 -.02
Trauma Severity -.13 .03 -.17**
When trauma occurred .00 .00 .04
Confided in others .07 .03 .10*
N = 693. For Model 1 the R2 is .04 and the F for the change in R2 is 6.81 (p < .001). For Model 2 the R2 is .26 and the F for the change in R2 is 40.62 (p <
.001). For Model 3 the R2 is .28 and the F for the change in R2 is 7.54 (p < .001). For Model 4 the R2 is .32 and the F for the change in R2 is 8.34 (p < .001).
*p < .05;
**p < .01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t006
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variance with Neuroticism most strongly associated (negatively) with life satisfaction). In
Model 3 we added the three mentalized affectivity components. This model accounted for 28%
of the variance with both Processing and Expressing being associated with life satisfaction. In
Model 4 we added trauma variables. This model accounted for 32% of the variance. Both the
severity of the trauma and the amount that participants reported confiding in others were sig-
nificantly associated with life satisfaction. In this Model, Processing was most strongly associ-
ated with life satisfaction, behind Neuroticism, and confiding in others after the trauma.
Part 3: Links to psychological disorders and treatment
18 psychological disorders vs controls. We next examined how MA components differed
across clinical diagnoses. Table 7 reports the sample characteristics across clinical diagnoses.
The control group consisted of only those who denied having had been diagnosed with any of
the 18 disorders presented to them. Each of the clinical groups included participants who indi-
cated they had been diagnosed with the respective disorder, including those who indicated
multiple diagnoses (i.e. comorbidities). We only included groups in the analysis who had an N
of 10 or above.
Considering some of the clinical groups were relatively small, in order to generate the most
robust conclusions possible, we first performed a comparison of a clinical group comprising of
all those who indicated a diagnosis vs controls who did not indicated a diagnosis.
Table 7. Sample characteristics of clinical diagnoses.
Diagnosis N N (not comorbid) %
Control Group 1,448 — 51.0
Anxiety Disorders
GAD 230 39 8.1
OCD 43 4 1.5
Panic Disorder 68 10 2.4
PTSD 73 15 2.6
Social Anxiety Disorder 125 19 4.4
Eating Disorders
Anorexia 18 1 0.6
Bulimia 16 2 0.6
Mood Disorders
Bipolar 44 5 1.5
Depression 412 144 14.5
SAD 33 3 1.2
Neurodevelopmental Disorders
ADHD 125 47 4.4
Autism 29 13 1.4
Other
Alexithymia 1 0 0
Epilepsy 10 5 0.4
Synesthesia 26 3 0.9
Personality Disorders
Borderline 24 3 0.8
Narcissistic 3 0 0.1
Psychotic Disorders
Schizophrenia 4 0 0.1
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t007
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We performed ANCOVAs controlling for sex and age. For Identifying, the clinical group
(N = 620; M = 5.44; SD = .80) scored higher than the control group (N = 1416; M = 5.08; SD =
.90) [F = 57.79, p< .001]. For Processing, the clinical group (M = 4.38; SD = .87) scored lower
than the control group (M = 4.70; SD = .78)[F = 67.80, p< .001]. The difference between the
groups for Expressing was not significant.
Continuing with comparisons of larger groups, we then performed group comparisons
comparing controls to anxiety disorders (GAD, OCD, Panic Disorder, PTSD, and Social Anxi-
ety Disorder), eating disorders (Anorexia and Bulimia), Mood Disorders (Bipolar, Depression,
and SAD), Neurodevelopmental Disorders (ADHD and Autism), and Personality Disorders
(Borderline Personality Disorder and Narcissistic Personality Disorders). Table 8 reports the
results from each of the ANCOVAs. Because sex and age were included as covariates, and not
all participants indicated their sex and age, as can be seen, some of the Ns indicated in Table 9
for each clinical group are smaller than their respective Ns reported in Table 7. Specifically, the
M and SD are reported for the control group and each clinical group, and the F and p values
from the ANCOVAs are reported for each respective clinical group. The Anxiety Disorder
group scored higher on Identifying and lower on Processing than controls; the Eating Disorder
group had no significant differences than controls; the Mood Disorder group score higher on
Identifying and lower on Processing than controls; the Neurodevelopmental Disorder group
scored higher on Identifying, lower on Processing, and higher on Expressing than controls
(the differences in expressing was driven by the participants with ADHD and not autism—a
more detailed analysis is described below); and the Personality Disorder group, made up pri-
marily of Borderline Personality Disorders, scored higher on Identifying and lower on Pro-
cessing than controls.
Because each of the diagnoses that comprised the previous diagnostic groups can be charac-
teristically different from each other (e.g. ADHD and Autism in Neurodevelopmental Disor-
ders), we therefore next performed more detailed analyses by performing ANCOVAs for each
of the clinical groups compared to controls. There was a total of 18 ANCOVAs performed
reported in Table 9. As in Tables 8 and 9 the M and SD are reported for the control group and
each clinical group, and the F and p values from the ANCOVAs are reported for each respec-
tive clinical group.
All of the anxiety disorders showed this pattern (except for OCD which did not have a sig-
nificant difference from controls for Identifying). The GAD and social anxiety disorder groups
both scored higher on Expressing than controls. For eating disorders, there was no significant
difference between any of the MA components, suggesting the mean differences between eat-
ing disorders and controls were accounted for by sex differences in the groups. Both bipolar
and depression groups scored higher on Identifying and lower on Processing than controls.
The seasonal affective disorder (SAD) group scored significantly lower on Processing but not
Identifying. There were no significant differences between the mood disorder groups and
Table 8. MA mean comparisons across clinical diagnoses.
Identifying Processing Expressing
Diagnosis N M SD F p M SD F p M SD F p
Control Group (no diagnosis) 1416 5.09 .90 - - 4.70 .78 - - 4.48 .99 - -
Anxiety Disorders 340 5.52 .80 51.71 .000 4.32 .88 52.91 .000 4,59 1.07 2.47 .116
Eating Disorders 29 5.33 .71 0.46 .497 4.43 .79 1.90 .168 4.46 1.25 .36 .552
Mood Disorders 412 5.48 .80 51.36 .000 4.28 .86 82.02 .000 4.50 1.00 .396 .529
Neurodevelopmental Disorders 140 5.43 .82 17.77 .000 4.49 .93 7.35 .007 4.67 1.10 5.27 .022
Personality Disorders 26 5.63 .86 7.75 .005 4.32 1.07 5.25 .022 4.71 1.11 1.14 2.86
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t008
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control groups on Expressing. Those with ADHD scored higher on Identifying than controls
and those with autism scored lower on Processing than controls. The ADHD group scored
higher on Expressing than the control group. In terms of other groups that were unclassified,
epilepsy and synesthesia groups had no significant differences than controls for the MA com-
ponents. The borderline group scored higher on Identifying and lower on Processing than
controls. Mean differences are visually displayed in Fig 5. Overall, these comparisons show
that the components of mentalized affectivity are linked to psychopathology with a general
pattern of high Identifying and low Processing.
Psychological treatment. Sample characteristics and mean differences in MA compo-
nents for each of the psychological treatment variables are displayed in Table 10. We first per-
formed an ANCOVA comparing those in therapy compared to those not currently in therapy.
The currently in therapy group scored higher than the not currently in therapy group on Iden-
tifying (F(1, 1435) = 36.80, p< .001), lower on Processing (F(1, 1435) = 28.71, p< .001), and
higher on Expressing (F(1, 1435) = 11.23, p< .01). We next performed ANCOVAs between
therapy group (those who are both currently and have had prior therapy but not currently in
it) and no therapy group (no current or prior therapy). The results replicated the analysis of
those currently in therapy: The therapy group scored higher on the no therapy group on Iden-
tifying (F(1, 2058) = 127.48, p< .001), lower on Processing (F(1, 2058) = 21.32, p< .001), and
Table 9. MA mean comparisons across clinical diagnoses.
Identifying Processing Expressing
Diagnosis N M SD F p M SD F p M SD F p
Control Group (no diagnosis) 1416 5.09 .90 - - 4.70 .78 - - 4.48 .99 - -
Anxiety Disorders
GAD 217 5.55 .79 37.93 .000 4.30 .94 39.18 .000 4.68 1.09 6.18 .013
OCD 42 5.33 .83 2.92 .088 3.95 .85 36.49 .000 4.22 .75 2.45 .117
Panic Disorder 67 5.47 .84 7.95 .005 4.25 .83 19.13 .000 4.58 1.13 .37 .545
PTSD 66 5.75 .74 25.26 .000 4.30 1.00 16.36 .000 4.78 1.00 2.82 .093
Social Anxiety Disorder 118 5.57 .72 26.65 .000 4.25 .83 28.17 .000 4.22 .97 6.79 .009
Eating Disorders
Anorexia 18 5.27 .54 .03 .854 4.32 .77 2.93 .087 4.39 1.09 .25 .614
Bulimia 16 5.27 .84 .06 .799 4.73 .78 .18 .675 4.80 1.34 1.28 .258
Mood Disorders
Bipolar 41 5.59 .74 9.90 .002 4.23 .86 13.42 .000 4.59 1.07 .24 .625
Depression 393 5.48 .78 49.60 .000 4.28 .86 83.04 .000 4.54 1.03 .34 .558
SAD 32 5.36 .76 1.54 .214 4.41 .98 4.06 .044 4.70 .92 .84 .358
Neurodevelopmental Disorders
ADHD 120 5.50 .81 20.69 .000 4.60 .88 1.32 .251 4.74 1.07 7.38 .007
Autism 26 5.25 .84 1.07 .300 3.98 .99 21.15 .000 4.40 1.17 .08 .780
Other
Alexithymia - - - - - - - - - - - -
Epilepsy 10 5.22 .99 .14 .705 4.67 .95 .04 .851 4.02 1.18 2.62 .105
Synesthesia 25 5.46 .99 2.18 .140 4.42 1.06 2.34 .126 4.60 .98 .18 .672
Personality Disorders
Borderline 23 5.63 .82 6.17 .013 4.29 .99 5.22 .022 4.75 1.17 1.50 .221
Narcissistic - - - - - - - - - - - -
Psychotic Disorder
Schizophrenia - - - - - - - - - - - -
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t009
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higher on Expressing (F(1, 2058) = 20.72, p< .001). A visual mean comparison of the trauma
group vs. no trauma group is displayed in Fig 6.
Years in treatment. We next examined the links between years in treatment and menta-
lized affectivity. Responses ranged from .5 to 59 years in therapy. Zero-order correlations
showed that years in therapy was positively associated with Identifying (r = .09, p< .001) and
expressing (r = .06, p< .05). There was no significant association between years in therapy and
Processing (r = —.04, p = .14). However, the responses to years in therapy were skewed as the
Fig 5. Mean differences of MA components across clinical diagnoses.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.g005
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majority of responses indicated that subjects had between .5 and 5 years of therapy. Therefore,
to get a better indication of the links between years in therapy and mentalized affectivity, we
separated years in therapy into 6 groups (.5 to 1 year in therapy; 1.5 to 2 years in therapy; 2.5 to
3 years in therapy, 3.5 to 4 years in therapy, 4.5 to 5 years in therapy, and more than five years
in therapy). We then performed ANOVAs with the years in therapy groups as the IV and each
of the MA components as the DV. Results showed that there was a significant effect for Identi-
fying (F(5, 1257) = 6.99, p< .001) and Expressing (F(5, 1257) = 2.26, p = .46). Post-hoc Tukey
tests revealed that for Identifying, the .5 to 1 year of therapy group scored significantly lower
than the 3.5 to 4 years in therapy group, the 4.5 to 5 years in therapy group, and the more than
5 years in therapy group. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed no significant differences between
groups for Processing or Expressing. Mean MA scores between groups are displayed visually
in Fig 7.
Types of psychological treatment. We next examined mean differences between MA
scores and reported treatment modalities. The control group consisted of participants who
indicated they had no history of psychological treatment and those in each treatment group
consisted of participants who indicated that they only had the type of treatment in question
(i.e. participants who indicated they had multiple treatment modalities were not included in
the treatment groups). As several of the groups had small Ns we included No Therapy,
Table 10. Sample characteristics and MA mean differences across therapeutic treatment variables.
Identifying Processing Expressing
Variable N % N (only) % (only) M SD M SD M SD
Currently in therapy
Yes 247 12.2 — — 5.63 0.81 4.33 0.87 4.73 1.10
No 1,753 86.9 — — 5.15 0.88 4.63 0.80 4.45 0.98
Rather not say 17 0.8 — — — — — — — —
Previously or currently in therapy
Yes 1263 44.8 — — 5.44 0.84 4.55 0.85 4.67 1.01
No 1557 55.2 — — 4.98 0.90 4.69 0.77 4.40 0.99
Years in therapy
0.5 to 1 year 598 47.3 — — 5.31 0.83 4.59 0.83 4.60 0.99
1.5 to 2 years 223 17.7 — — 5.46 0.76 4.56 0.78 4.70 0.98
2.5 to 3 years 115 9.1 — — 5.46 0.90 4.44 0.92 4.58 0.96
3.5 to 4 years 63 5.0 — — 5.69 0.94 4.63 0.97 4.90 1.16
4.5 to 5 years 73 5.8 — — 5.62 0.79 4.52 0.82 4.85 1.04
More than 5 years 191 15.1 — — 5.64 0.82 4.47 0.90 4.75 1.06
Type of therapy
I do not know 257 9 — — — — — — — —
I have never been in therapy 1557 55.2 — — 5.09 0.89 4.64 0.80 4.45 1.00
Cognitive behavioral therapy 348 12.3 155 6.1 5.50 0.80 4.47 0.95 4.75 1.03
Couples therapy 90 3.2 39 1.5 4.85 0.85 4.63 0.96 4.68 1.03
Creative arts therapy 30 1.1 3 .1 5.90 0.21 4.48 0.18 4.81 0.60
Dialectical behavior therapy 42 1.5 3 .1 5.29 0.94 4.76 0.77 5.23 0.33
Exposure therapy 22 0.8 1 .0 4.42 — 3.30 — 4.77 —
Family therapy 101 3.6 45 1.8 5.27 0.73 4.70 0.94 4.58 0.97
Group therapy 93 3.3 12 .5 5.63 0.77 4.80 1.01 4.91 1.21
Mindfulness-based therapy 141 5 32 1.3 5.73 0.66 4.73 0.74 4.65 0.81
Psychoanalysis 102 3.6 35 1.4 5.42 0.47 4.51 0.86 4.85 1.05
Psychotherapy 329 11.6 162 6.3 5.39 0.84 4.56 0.83 4.61 1.01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.t010
The Mentalized Affectivity Scale
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264 October 18, 2017 20 / 27
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Couples Therapy, Family Therapy, Mindfulness-based Ther-
apy, Psychoanalyses, and Psychotherapy groups in the analysis. We performed an ANOVA
with treatment groups as the IV and MA component scores as the DV. There was a significant
effect for all three MA components: F(6, 2506) = 9.07, p< .001) for Identifying, F(6, 2506) =
2.53, p< .05) for Processing, and F(6, 2506) = 3.20, p<. 01) for Expressing. Post-hoc Tukey
tests showed that the CBT, Mindfulness-based Therapy, and Psychotherapy treatment groups
scored higher on Identifying than controls for Identifying. The Mindfulness-based Therapy
group scored higher than Couples Therapy for Identifying. The CBT group scored significant
lower on Processing than controls. The difference between the CBT group and control group
Fig 6. Differences in MA scores across therapy and no therapy groups.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.g006
Fig 7. Mean scores on MA components across years in therapy.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.g007
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for Expressing approached significance (p = .50). Mean differences are displayed visually in
Fig 8.
Discussion
Summary
The present study provides a general and specific overview of the theory and assessment of
mentalized affectivity. In part 1, consistent with our initial hypothesis, results showed three
robust and transparent components underlying mentalized affectivity: Identifying, Processing,
and Expressing. Hierarchical modeling showed how Processing delineated from Identifying,
and Expressing delineated from Processing. The MAS is the first emotion regulation measure
that captures all three of these concepts in a single measure and is the first measure to bring
emotion regulation and mentalization together. The results also showed that the measure had
high reliability and validity.
In part 2 of the results, we showed how the three MA factors were associated with demo-
graphics, personality traits, well-being, and trauma histories. Linear regressions showed that
when controlling for all other variables (demographics, personality, and trauma) that Process-
ing was positively correlated with life satisfaction. This provides initial evidence that Process-
ing is a key element to focus on in psychological treatment. Personality correlation confirmed
and contrasted our initial predictions. For example, we did not anticipate that Neuroticism
would be positively correlated to Identifying and negatively correlated with life satisfaction.
In part 3 of the results, we demonstrated how MA factors were linked to psychological diag-
noses and psychological treatment. Results showed a trend in which psychological disorders
displayed a pattern of high Identifying and low Processing scores. Although we had accurately
predicted that low Processing scores would be feature of psychological disorders, we did not
anticipate that high Identifying scores would be a feature as well. Taking into consideration
that the high Identifying scores were present for anxiety disorders, mood disorders, and per-
sonality disorders, and that Identifying was positively correlated with Neuroticism, future
research should explore the etiology and development of personality traits, emotion regulation,
and clinical diagnoses and to generate a better understanding of causation. It may be that
those who struggle with anxiety, mood, and relationships use Identifying (participating the
aspect of idetnfiyng where the emotions stem from) as an adaptive strategy to better
Fig 8. MA scores across different therapy treatments.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185264.g008
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understand themselves and their condition in an attempt (whether successful or not) to
improve their well-being.
The results from histories of psychological treatment were less robust than the results from
clinical diagnoses. These results indicated that Identifying emotions were higher for those with
3.5 or more years of therapy. Comparisons between treatment modalities showed that those
subjects who had participated in CBT, Mindfulness-based treatments, and Psychotherapy
scored higher on Identifying than those who had not engaged in psychological treatment.
Implications for emotion regulation and mentalization
The newly developed MAS can be useful for researchers and clinicians studying emotion reg-
ulation and mentalization. In the introduction, we outlined how prior measures of emotion
regulation have captured aspects of Identifying, Processing, and Expression, but that none of
these prior measures captures all three in a single measure. Further, several popular measures
in the past focused on deficits and dysfunction of emotion regulation, rather than a broader
spectrum of emotion regulation applied to typical functioning. Our results have addressed
this prior limitation in theory and both measurement application. Those interested in a
multi-dimensional approach to emotion regulation may find the MAS useful. Development,
cognitive, personality, social psychologists, along with neuroscientists and Big Data scientists
may find this measure particularly useful either as a primary or supplement focus in their
studies.
The measure may also be relevant for those studying mentalization and reflective function-
ing. Prior measures of reflective functioning focus on one’s cognitive and affective ability to
understand the thoughts and feelings of oneself and others. The MAS extends those measures
not only by including aspects of processing emotions and expressing them, but also by
highlighting the ability to link emotions to prior and present contexts. This is a fundamental
theme within the theory of mentalization, which has not been explicitly incorporated in the
current self-report measures within reflective functioning. Indeed, measures on mentalization
have been criticized regarding their validity, usage, the time and expense required, and the
broadness of its conceptualization [37]. Critiques of mentalization assessments may find that
the MAS addressed some of these concerns both conceptually and psychometrically.
Taken together, the MAS is an intriguing addition to the literature of pre-existing measures
on the topic. Indeed, given the numerous emotion regulation and mentalization measures that
exist, researchers and clinicians may choose to determine which measure to use in their work
based on the research or clinical situation and the dimensions that they would like to measure.
For example, the DERS has several dimensions that capture maladaptive behavior that the
MAS does not, including their Nonacceptance of emotional responses (Nonacceptance), Diffi-
culties in Engaging in Goal-Directed (Goals), and Impulse of Control Difficulties, dimensions
(Impulse). And rather than just measuring unipolar direction of mentalization, the RFQ
makes the distinction between certainty and uncertainty of mental states. The FREE measures
expression and suppression of emotions given specific positive and negative contexts. In total,
the literature on emotional regulation and mentalization has a rich source of measures from
which researchers and clinicians can choose from based on their research and therapeutic
goals.
Implications for clinical psychology and psychiatry
Our results demonstrated a trend that those with psychological disorders scored high in Iden-
tifying emotions and low in Processing, a result which may be useful in the context of supple-
menting diagnosis and assessment. There has been a growing movement to understand
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psychopathology in terms of transdiagnostic criteria rather than classification systems
employed by manuals such as the DSM-5 or ICD-10 [38]. Indeed, several of these proposals
suggest a bi-factorial model of psychopathology [39–40]. Part of this movement is in response
to the idea that comorbidities are the “rule” rather than the exception [38]. Our results, if repli-
cated in different clinical contexts and using different study designs (e.g. longitudinal data),
may help to better understand these transdiagnostic models and comorbidities.
In terms of treatment, although these results are based on retrospective accounts and cau-
sation cannot be inferred, it is interesting that Identifying was linked both to years in treat-
ment as well as modalities in psychological treatment, but Processing (not Identifying) was
linked to well-being across the general population. Various modalities of treatment, includ-
ing CBT and psychotherapy have a long history of enabling patients to identify emotions and
understand their meaning within present and prior contexts. Expressing emotions and being
able to communicate them is also a valued concept. However, Identifying was not linked to
life-satisfaction scores, and Expressing was not a significant predictor after controlling for
prior trauma variables. This suggests that psychological treatments may want to focus more
on processing emotions than only identifying them. There may be false beliefs, where the
goal of treatment is simply to identify emotions and understand their meaning. However,
these results suggest that without the capacity to modulate and refine them, well-being will
not be increased.
The MAS is intriguing as a clinical tool: as a way to better understand what kinds of patients
have what kinds of problems with using emotions. Our measure provides support for Jurist’s
(in press) discussion of interventions to cultivate mentalized affectivity in patients, based upon
specifying problems with using emotions. A final thought to ponder is whether every treat-
ment—regardless of orientation—aims to improve mentalized affectivity. And further,
whether targeting mentalized affectivity could be just as effective in short-term as in long-term
treatment [41].
Limitations and future directions
The main limitation of the present study is that it relied on self-reports and retrospective
accounts. Therefore, causation cannot be inferred from the results. To overcome this limita-
tion, future research should administer this assessment longitudinally in clinic settings such as
hospitals and community clinics. This will this advance understanding regarding the ways in
which mentalized affectivity plays a role in therapeutic growth and development, but it can
also provide valuable metrics for psychologists and psychiatrists to gage the progress of their
patients throughout treatment.
Social, cognitive and affective neuroscience have begun to explore aspects of emotion regu-
lation neurobiologically [42–44]. For example, a recent meta-analysis showed increases in
activity in bilateral amygdala/ parahippocampal gyrus during “upregulated states” but
decreased in “downregulated” states [45]. Neuroscience has also showed interesting patterns
regarding mentalization through imaging studies [46–47]. Neuroscience may find the MAS a
complementary measure of trait emotion regulation and mentalization.
An important limitation of the present research is the method used to obtain information
about clinical diagnoses. Because of the large sample size, we were unable to employ additional
checks for diagnoses such as follow-up phone interviews about diagnoses. Indeed, we obtained
diagnostic information along similar standards used in previous online studies that have exam-
ined clinical diagnoses in large samples [48]. More detailed analyses regarding MA compo-
nents and clinical diagnoses including etiology could be optimized in the future by conducting
research in clinic settings.
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Conclusion
In this paper we advanced prior theory and research by introducing a new model and assess-
ment of emotion regulation. We used a large sample to show how three distinct aspects of
mentalized affectivity (identifying, processing, and expressing emotions) are linked to person-
ality traits, well-being, trauma, diagnoses of psychological disorders, and histories of psycho-
logical treatment. The mentalized affectivity scale (MAS) is a multi-dimensional and reliable
tool that can be useful in future research in both clinical and non-clinical settings and within
many areas of areas of psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience.
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